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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
WRONGFUL DEATH IN ADMIRALTY
With the recent completion of the Arkansas River Navi-
gation Project, both state courts and federal district courts
sitting in Oklahoma are faced with the prospect of increased
exposure to litigation involving maritime matters, which have
heretofore largely eluded these tribunals. Of particular sig-
nificance to the Oklahoma bar is the potential commercial
navigation that the Kerr-McClellan channel is envisioned to
inspire. Accompanying this newly-created commercial mari-
time traffic will be new issues in maritime matters to which
Oklahoma lawyers have been largely unexposed in the past.
For insofar as the Oklahoma bar has heretofore been exposed
to admiralty and its peculiar concepts, such exposure has been
limited to relatively uncomplicated maritime tort litigation
arising from pleasure boating accidents. It is the limited pur-
pose of this paper to examine the currently available remedies
for maritime wrongful death actions, not to speculate as to
the types of maritime matters which may or may not arise
in Oklahoma.
In regard to an important preliminary matter, it should
be noted that the recently dedicated channel is subject to
the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. In fact, the
Arkansas River, which forms to a great extent the route of
the channel, was held to be a navigable waterway within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States long before the
plans for the navigation channel were envisioned.1 Although
a thorough discussion of the navigable water concept is un-
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77
(1922); Grand River Dam Authority v. Going, 29 F. Supp.
316 (N.D. Okl. 1939). In both cases it was held that the
Arkansas River constituted navigable waters, and thus was
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts from
the confluence of the Grand River, a route roughly equiva-
lent to the current navigation channel.
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necessary for the purposes of this paper,2 it is elementary
that the practicing attorney realize that occurrences upon the
channel will pose new issues, in re.ard to both the jurisdic-
tional questions and substantive rules applicable.
While special limitations prohibit an extensive discussion
of the attendant jurisdictional problems inherent in admiralty,
it is nevertheless of initial importance to examine the im-
mediate questions that will be presented in such cases. Ad-
miralty jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the courts of the
United States by the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. HI, § 2
specifies: "The judicial power shall extend .... to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. 3 Thus, a potential
litigant's first task is to determine whether or not his claim
is either within or without this rather vague constitutional
grant of judicial power. Without going into great detail, the
fundamental test of admiralty's jurisdiction, assuming of
course that the particular claim arose upon a navigable water,
depends upon whether the claim involved arose in tort or
contract. The test of jurisdiction in admiralty over a contract
2 .. . the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States ex-
tends to all waters, salt or fresh, with or without tides,
natural or artificial, which are in fact navigable in inter-
state or foreign water commerce, whether or not the parti-
cular body of water is wholly within a state, and whether or
not the occurrence or transaction that is the subject matter
of the suit is confined to one state." G. GiLMOBE & C. BLACK,
Tim LAW OF A~mrmALTY 28-29 (1957). See also ex parte
Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 555 (1867); The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
233 (1851).
8 Unfortunately, the precise extent of the quoted jurisdic-
tional grant was not further defined in the Constitution,
so that some uncertainties as to its limits persist, in spite
of extensive efforts, both statutory and decisional, to speci-
fy its limits. See G. GiLmoRE & C. BLACK, THlE LAW OF AD-
AtmALTY 18-30 (1957). However, one authority indicates
that the subject matter described by this provision is de-
finable, "albeit at a relatively high level of abstraction."
D. ROBERTsoN, ADmIRALTY AND FEDERALSM 3 (1970).
19721
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claim may be generally said to be "subject matter. ' 4 That is,
whether or not a cause of action arising from a contract is
within the admiralty jurisdiction is dependent upon the mari-
time nature of the contract. On the other hand, the word
"locality" broadly defines the scope of jurisdiction in admiralty
over maritime torts.5 To a great extent, decisional law has
been responsible for defining the scope of admiralty's juris-
diction in these particular areas, although various statutory
provisions have lately become of increased importance in de-
termining whether or not admiralty has jurisdiction in any
particular case.6
Once the preliminary determination has been made that
admiralty does indeed have subject matter jurisdiction, the
prospective litigant is then faced with making the determina-
tion of whether or not admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive, or
is concurrent with various other courts under the savings to
suitors clause. The apparent all-inclusive grant of federal
jurisdiction in admiralty is quite illusory, being limited by
the so-called "saving to suitors" clause contained in the Judici-
ary Act of 1789. 7 This provision, has the effect of granting
4 The courts have looked to the maritime nature of the con-
tract to determine whether or not it is within the admiralty
jurisdiction, rather than to the place where it is made or
is to be performed. This "subject matter" test was first
enunciated in New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870). For a concise historical back-
ground of the cases and factors that influenced the develop-
ment of this test for jurisdiction in admiralty over con-
tracts, see G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW § 19
(1939).
5 The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); Atlantic Trans-
port Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914); Weinstein v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). See also
G. RoBINsoN, HANDBOOK oF AD miALTY LAW, §§ 9-11 (1939)
and Note, History of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court of the United States, 5 AmE. L. REv. 581 (1871).
6 See Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1948).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1) (1964).
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both state courts and federal district courts (on their civil
as opposed to admiralty docket) concurrent jurisdiction in
cases in which the remedy sought was one originally within
the cognizance of the common law courts. In essence, then,
this provision allows a suitor a choice among three possible
forums in a particular case, the choice depending largely up-
on the differing remedies available in the particular forum.8
As indicated, the savings clause gives law courts concur-
rent jurisdiction with admiralty courts in cases in which com-
mon law courts were competent to grant the remedy sought.
The term "law courts" is meant to include both state courts
of general jurisdiction and federal district courts on the civil
docket, acting pursuant to either their diversity powers or
their jurisdiction over federal questions.9 However, where the
sole remedy pursued is a libel against the particular vessel
involved, either in tort or contract, so that the proceeding is
of an in rem nature, jurisdiction is exclusively with the prov-
ince of a particular federal district court sitting in its spe-
cialized capacity as an admiralty tribunal.'0
Decisional law has for the most part clarified the scope
of the concurrent jurisdiction vested in the law courts" as
a result of the savings clause. With a few rather important
exceptions, then, the litigant would be faced with few juris-
dictional difficulties, were it not for the presence of a fourth
possibility. This possibility exists as a result of the decision
in Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co. 12 In that case,
8 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866). See D.
ROBERTSON, ADIMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 123-35 (1970).
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
:0 See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866); The
Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1866).
" For the purpose of this paper, the term "law courts" is used
to refer to either a state court of general jurisdiction or
a United States district court, acting within either its diver-
sity or federal question power, as opposed to the federal
district court's admiralty docket.
12 237 U.S. 303 (1915); see Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey,
177 U.S. 638 (1899).
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the Court upheld a proceeding in personam against the owner
of the vessel involved and the ancillary attachment of the
vessel itself as security for the plaintiff's claim as being with-
in the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court under the
savings clause. State courts likewise have jurisdiction over
quasi in rem proceedings, in which the attachment of a non-
resident defendant's property (such as his vessel) establishes
the court's jurisdiction, in addition to providing security for
the plaintiff's claim.13 These alternatives are illustrative of
the problems facing a litigant who has a maritime claim, either
in tort or in contract.
If it be determined that jurisdiction in admiralty is con-
current with the law courts, the litigant is then confronted
with the problem of choosing the proper forum. However,
regardless of the forum chosen, the substantive rules of mari-
time law will be applied by the chosen forum so that uni-
formity may be achieved.14 Thus, the basic question presented
in a litigant's choice of forum (assuming, of course, that juris-
diction is in fact concurrent) is whether or not the cause of
action is properly triable by a jury. For in a federal district
court sitting in its specialized capacity as an admiralty trib-
unal, all actions are tried to the judge sitting without a jury.1"
This is so principally because the law of admiralty tradi-
tionally is derived from the civil, as opposed to the common,
law system of jurisprudence. If the civil docket of a federal
district court (either on the basis of diversity or in a case
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States) is deemed preferable within the savings clause, the
normal rules regarding juries are applicable, as is the case
if a state court is selected.
1' Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185 (1870); Taylor v.
Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857).
14 See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358
U.S. 625 (1959); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1953); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239,
(1942). See also D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AD FED=RALIsm
194-201 (1970).
15 The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391 (1823).
[Vol. 8, No. 1
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With this necessarily brief jurisdictional background in
mind, the reader's attention is directed to the principal subject
matter of this paper. It was early held in Baker v. Bolton'16
that the wrongful death of a human was not an actionable
wrong which would entitle the injured party to recover dam-
ages for the tort. Legal historians have concluded that the
origin of this seemingly unjust rule applicable at common law
was to a large extent dependent upon the presence of the
antiquated felony-merger doctrine.1'7 The effect of this doc-
trine was to deny any recovery by an injured party from the
tortfeasor where the act complained of amounted to both a
tort and a felony. According to this English common law
view, the primary wrong to be redressed was that to the
Crown, not to the party actually injured by the wrongful con-
duct. Since one of the criminal penalties exacted by the Crown
was the forfeiture of the convicted felon's chattels to the
Crown, none of the tortfeasor's property remained from which
the injured party could satisfy a judgment, if one were render-
ed in his favor. There being no available remedy, there could
be no legal wrong in a tortious sense. The primitive basis of
this rule has been recognized ever since by both commenta-
tors and judges, and has been long abrogated if not explicitly
overruled in England. Nevertheless, the rule was adopted in
the United States' 8 and long continued to survive, at least
in the absence of statute.
In The Harrisburg,9 the United States Supreme Court
adopted the rule as applicable in maritime actions, holding
that in the absence of statute there is no action for wrongful
death in admiralty. Even though the court acknowledged the
inequitable nature and operation of the rule, it followed its
I0 1 Camp 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (C.A. 1808). For a thorough
discussion of this decision, see Holdsworth, The Origin of
the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REv. 431 (1916) [here-
inafter cited as Holdsworth].
117 See Holdsworth at 432.
I Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1878).
1 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
1972]
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then recent decision in Insurance Co. v. Brame,20 which adopt-
ed the English common law rule as the rule to be applied in
the United States21 by agreeing that no civil action is avail-
able for wrongful death. In The Harrisburg,22 the court ap-
plied Brame in reversing the decision of the two lower courts
which had awarded damages to the libellant.
Ever since the Court's decision in The Harrisburg, the
availability of a remedy for wrongful death has caused much
uncertainty among the various tribunals which sought to pre-
dict the consequences of the rule thus promulgated.2 Vari-
ous statutory provisions thereinafter enacted sought to rectify
the situation, although they met only with varying degrees
of success. 24 In spite of the uncertain application of these
statutes, their enactment manifested a public policy in favor
20 95 U.S. 754.
21 It must be remembered that both Insurance Co. v. Brame
and The Harrisburg were decided at a time when the rule
of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 166 (1842) was in effect.
22 119 U.S. 199.
2 See generally D. ROBERTSON, ADiALTY AmD FEDERALISM
222-41 (1970).
24 The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920). The
Jones Act provides:
... in case of the death of any seaman as a result of
any such personal injury the personal representative of
such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the
right of action for death in the case of railway employees
shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be
under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
Thus, the Jones Act provisions are applicable in death cases
only if the decedent can be classified as a seaman, and only
if the action is brought by his personal representative
against his employer. For a comprehensive treatment of
the judicially developed rules arising from application of
the Jones Act, see 1 P. EDELMAN, MARITIm INJURY AN
DEATH 63-144 (1960).
(Vol. 8, No. 1
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of awarding such damages, a manifestation that was later to
have important ramifications, as will hereinafter be indicated.
In light of this manifestation of a public policy that was favor-
able to awarding damages to survivors of persons who met
with wrongful death, the favorite judicial technique of avoid-
ing the strict meaning of The Harrisburg rule was that of
statutory interpretation. In particular, the word "seaman" in
the Jones Act2 5 proved to be a favored source for broadening
the remedies available to the survivors of a maritime em-
ployee killed while working upon navigable waters.2 6 Other
statutes27 which afforded a remedy for various maritime em-
ployees were broadly interpreted whenever possible in order
to allow recovery, thus avoiding the harsh common law rule.
In addition to the aforementioned federal statutes, in
the case where the death complained of occurred upon an
inland or territorial waterway which otherwise constituted a
navigable water within the admiralty jurisdiction, the appli-
cable state wrongful death statutes were often available to
provide a remedy to the survivors statutorily entitled to re-
cover.28 The applicability of these various state wrongful death
statutes has long caused confusion among the courts when
confronted with the problem. The problem was itself compli-
cated by the Supreme Court's decisions in two rather am-
bivalent cases. Prior to the Court's decisions in Southern Paci-
fic Co. v. Jensen29 and Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,30
25 46 U.S.C. § 3688 (1920).
26 See 1. P. EDELMAN, MARITIE INJURY AND DEATH 63-144
(1960).
27 E.g., Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq.
(1920) (which applies only if death occurs on navigable
waters beyond a marine league from shore); Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 901 et seq. (1927).
28 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); see Harolds,
Maritime Death Claims and the Applicability of State Law,
35 TUL. L. REV. 85 (1960).
29 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
80 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
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both state survival and wrongful death statutes had been ap-
plied rather freely by the admiralty courts, t h e federal
district courts and state courts with concurrent jurisdiction
under the savings clause. After Jensen and Chelentis, in which
the uniformity concept was announced, courts facing the prob-
lem remained somewhat uncertain as to the availability of
such statutes in appropriate cases. Part of the problem could
be directly linked to The Harrisburg rule, but more directly
it stemmed from Jensen, which itself involved an action to
recover damages for wrongful death under a workmen's com-
pensation statute.
In Jensen, however, Mr. Justice McReynolds indicated
that state death legislation constituted a possible exception
to the supremacy or uniformity concept therein enunciated,
stating that ". . . it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
define with exactness just how far the general maritime law
may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation.
That this may be done to some extent cannot be denied.81
Shortly thereafter, the Court held in the case of Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia32 that a state wrongful death statute was
available to give rise to a cause of action in admiralty for a
maritime death. In Garcia, however, the court denied recov-
ery on the ground that the California statute of limitations
operated to bar the cause of action. With this decision, an im-
portant exception to the Jensen-Chelentis uniformity prin-
ciple was upheld, thereby broadening the remedies available
to survivors in wrongful death actions. However, application
of state wrongful death statutes required the courts to apply
the statute as an integrated whole, so that in many cases the
doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
were available to negate any existing cause of action, thus
operating to a great extent to nullify the possible applica-
bility of the state statutes. Since the substantive rules of ad-
31 244 U.S. at 216.
32 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
[Vol. 8, No. 1
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miralty are largely derived from the civil law system, in
which the concept of comparative negligence is the rule and
not the exception, the application of state wrongful death
statutes often violates the doctrine of uniformity that t h e
Jensen-Chelentis principle was thought to require. Again,
however, Garcia can be largely explained as a judicial at-
tempt to overcome the harsh result required by The Harris-
burg rule in the absence of a statutory remedy to the con-
trary.88 In any event, the application of state wrongful death
statutes by the courts in cases after Garcia is indicative of
the judicial attempts to fashion suitable remedies in order
to evade the common law rule of Baker v. Bolton.34
Many of the difficulties attendant with this approach were
due to the judiciary's failure to distinguish between the source
of the duty imposed and the remedies available in the event
of a breach of that duty. The problem was perhaps most
clearly emphasized in The rn/v Tungus v. Skovgaard.35 In that
case, the decedent was killed when he fell into a vat of hot
coconut oil, a fall that was occasioned by the spillage of an
amount of coconut oil on the deck as a result of the defective
operation of a pump. The decedent was an employee of El
Dorado Oil Works, which had been employed by the con-
signee of the oil to assist in discharging the oil from the ves-
sel. The decedent was called from his home by his employer
in order to repair the defective pump. His widow and ad-
ministratrix instituted a libel in admiralty against both the
vessel and its owners for damages occasioned by his death,
alleging both negligence and unseaworthiness as the cause of
her husband's death. Since the decedent was not a seaman
within the meaning of the Jones Act, that act36 was inappli-
23 See Harolds, Maritime Death Claims and the Applicability
of State Law, 35 TuL. L. REV. 85 (1960).
.4 1 Camp 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (C.A. 1808).
85 141 F. Supp. 653 (D.N.J. 1956), rev'd, 252 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir.
1957), cert. granted, 357 U.S. 903 (1958), affd, 358 U.S. 588
(1959).
8 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
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cable.3 7 Since the death occurred within a marine league from
shore, the Death on the High Seas Act38 was likewise inap-
plicable. Thus, death having occurred within the territorial
waters (though navigable) of the State of New Jersey, that
state's wrongful death statute had to provide the remedy, if
one were to be had. The difficulty with that rationale was
that the New Jersey courts had not previously determined
whether or not the statute included unseaworthiness as a
basis of liability.3 9
The district court dismissed the libel, holding that no
action for wrongful death could be predicated on the basis of
unseaworthiness, and that the respondents owed no duty to
the decedent to provide a safe place to work. The court of
appeals vacated the district court's decree dismissing the libel
in an en banc decision, and remanded for further proceedings.
However, the court divided on both the question of whether
or not the New Jersey statute encompassed unseaworthiness
as a basis of liability, and also as to whether or not the dis-
trict court had erred in its determination that no duty was
owed by the respondents to the decedent. Certiorari was
granted by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court affirmed, but split over the consequences to
follow the application of the state's wrongful death statute.40
37 See generally 1 P. EDELMAN, MARiTiM E INJURY AN) DEATH
63-144 (1960).
38 46 U.S.C. § § 761 et seq. (1920).
39 Thus, as Mr. Justice Frankfurther (concurring in the re-
sult) indicated, the case would seemingly be appropriate
for application of the doctrine of abstention, particularly
since a procedural remedy was available by which the New
Jersey courts could have been allowed to determine wheth-
er or not the statute encompassed unseaworthiness. 358
U.S. at 597. For a concise discussion of the abstention
doctrine, see C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970).
40 N.J.S.A. 2A: 31-1. The relevant portions of that statute are
reprinted in footnote 7 of the court's opinion.
(Vol. 8, No. 1
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The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice Stewart,41 con-
cluded that the court of appeals had not been clearly errone-
ous in its determination that unseaworthiness was encom-
passed by the applicable state statute as a basis of liability.
In so holding, the majority concluded that application of the
state statute required application of all its attendant state re-
strictions, including the availability of the defense of contribu-
tory negligence as a complete bar to the right to recover.
Since the district court has made no finding in regard to the
defense of contributory negligence, remand was proper for
that purpose. The Court stated:
"[A]dmiralty courts, when invoked to protect rights
rooted in state law, endeavor to determine the issues
in accordance with the substantive law of the State."
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245.
The policy expressed by a State Legislature in en-
acting a wrongful death statute is not merely that
death shall give rise to a right of recovery, nor even
that tortious conduct resulting in death shall be ac-
tionable, but that damages shall be recoverable when
conduct of a particular kind results in death. It is in-
cumbent upon a court enforcing that policy to en-
force it all; it may not pick or choose.
It is manifest, moreover, that acceptance of re-
spondent's argument would defeat the intent of Con-
gress to preserve state sovereignty over deaths caused
by maritime torts within the State's territorial waters.
The legislative history of the Death on the High Seas
Act discloses a clear congressional purpose to leave
"unimpaired the rights under State statutes as to
deaths on waters within the territorial jurisdiction of
the States." S. Rep. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3;
H. R. Rep. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 3. The record
of the debate in the House of Representatives preced-
41 Joined by Justices Harlan, Clark, Whittaker and Frank-
furter. As indicated, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred
separately in an opinion that was also applicable to a com-
panion case, United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook
Pilots Ass'n. v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
1972]
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ing passage of the bill reflects deep concern that the
power of the States to create actions for wrongful
death in no way be affected by enactment of the fed-
eral law. 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-4486.
There is no merit to the contention that application
of state law to determine rights arising from death in
state territorial waters is destructive of the uniformi-
ty of federal maritime law. Even Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen, which fathered the "uniformity" concept,
recognized that uniformity is not offended by "the
right given to recover in death cases." 244 U.S. 205,
at 216. It would be an anomaly to hold that a State
may create a right of action for death, but that it may
not determine the circumstances under which that
right exists. The power of a State to create such a
right includes of necessity the power to determine
when recovery shall be permitted and when it shall
not. Cf. Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155.42
Speaking for a minority of the Court, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan,43 concurring in part and dissenting in part, illustrated
the majority's failure to distinguish between the source of
the right and the remedy in an opinion which this writer be-
lieves demonstrates the crux of the uncertainty.44 According
to the minority's view, the acceptance of a state's wrongful
death statute as a remedy available in admiralty does not
carry with it the requirement that all of the statute's limita-
tions (such as the defense of contributory negligence as a com-
plete bar to recovery) be likewise applied in admiralty as
an integrated whole. In effect, the Brennan segment of the
Court felt that the body of federal maritime law should con-
42 358 U.S. at 593-94.
43 Joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
Douglas.
44 For a highly provocative discussion on this decision, see D.
ROBERTSON, ADm1mALTY Am FFDERALISm 225-36 (1970); see
also Cook, Death on Inland Waters, 18 HASTmGS L.J. 869
(1967); Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: The Devil's
Own Mess, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 158.
['Vol. 8, No. I
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sist of any applicable state remedial (e.g., wrongful death)
statutes by analogy only.45 Brennan's opinion stated:
State statutes of limitation applicable to analogous
types of claims have been utilized to define the limita-
tions of federal rights of action for which no federal
statute of limitations has been provided. . . This
remedial incident, tied up with the felt necessity of
having some statutory definition, is drawn upon not
because of any intent of the state legislatures to make
their statute applicable to federal claims, but because
it could be rationally utilized through analogy by
courts charged with the enforcement of federal rights
and duties and the construction of a proper pattern of
remedies to that end.46 (emphasis added).
In spite of the disparity between the two factions on the
Court at the time of The Tungus, the rationale enunciated in
that decision remained an obstacle to courts in their quest to
fashion suitable remedies in maritime death cases. In fact, in
Hess v. United States,47 the minority seemingly acquiesced
in The Tungus decision. The Court's consistent failure to al-
low a nonstatutory maritime death remedy has been consist-
ently criticized by lower courts, although they have felt com-
pelled to follow the decision and rationale in The Tungus.48
In all, the Court's treatment of the wrongful death cases seem-
ingly disregards the Jensen-Chelentis uniformity principle al-
together, as the disparate results themselves indicate.
Much of this uncertainty has since been rectified, how-
ever, by the Court's recent decision in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.49 In that case, the plaintiff's husband, a
longshoreman employed by the Gulf Florida Terminal Com-
45 D. ROBERTSON, AD MIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 228 (1970).
46 358 U.S. at 604.
47 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
48 In regard to the criticism directed toward The Tungus, see
Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832, 840-41 (5th Cir.
1965).
40 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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pany, was killed while working on board the vessel Palmetto
State. His- death occurred upon navigable waters within the
State of Florida. His widow began an action in a Florida court
as representative of the decedent's estate against States Marine
Lines, Inc., the owner of the vessel, to recover damages for
her husband's death, alleging both negligence and unsea-
worthiness as the bases of liability. States Marine removed
the case5" to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida on the basis of diversity of citizenship,
and there filed a third-party complaint against Gulf Florida
Terminal Company. Both defendants moved that the portion of
the plaintiff's complaint relating to unseaworthiness be dis-
missed, asserting that Florida's death statute51 did not encom-
pass unseaworthiness as a basis of liability. The court granted
the defendants' motion, but made the certification necessary
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to permit an interlocutory appeal. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified the
question, pursuant to a procedure afforded by Florida law,62 of
whether or not the state's death statute allowed recovery on
the basis of unseaworthiness. The Florida Supreme Court an-
swered the question in the negative.5 3 The Court of Appeals,
upon the return of the case from the Florida Supreme Court,
affirmed the district court's dismissal of that portion of the
plaintiff's complaint relating to unseaworthiness.64 Prior to
affirming, however, the court of appeals heard, without ob-
jection, the plaintiff's argument that she was entitled to re-
versal as a matter of federal maritime law without regard
to the scope of the state death statute, this new theory in
effect amounting to a direct attack on the soundness of The
Tungus decision. Even though the fifth circuit had previ-
50 Removal was granted pursuant to the procedure provided'
by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c) (1964) and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 38-41 (2d ed. 1970).
51 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.01 (1964).
52 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.031 (1961).
53 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1968).
54 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ously indicated its dissatisfaction with the body of law ex-
isting as a result of The Tungus,55 it felt compelled to reject
the plaintiff's argument, citing that decision in support of its
judgment. Certiorari was granted,56 and the United States was
invited to participate as amicus curiae,5 7 "to reconsider the
important question of remedies under federal maritime law
for tortious deaths on state territorial waters."' 58
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court 9 in which the Court declared, contrary to The Harris-
burg,60 that there is a right under general maritime law to
recover damages for death caused by a violation of maritime
duties. After reviewing the authority then existing, and the
criticism which it had engendered, the Court concluded that
the problem lay with The Harrisburg, not with The Tungus,
and expressly overruled the former decision. The factor that
seemed to be dispositive of the question before the Court was
the widespread enactment of statutes giving survivors the
right to recover damages for tortious death subsequent to the
decisions in Insurance Co. v. Brame6' and The Harrisburg62
These various statutes, both state and federal, indicated clear-
ly to the Court the public policy decision in favor of allow-
ing such recovery.6 By overruling The Harrisburg expressly,
and many of the decisions which impliedly followed, the Court
has seemingly achieved the uniformity in maritime death
cases that both Jensen and Chelentis were thought to protect.
For, by announcing the existence of a federally created mari-
5 Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965).
16 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
17 Id. at 952.
61 398 U.S. at 377.
9 Mr. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the considera-
tion or decision of this case.
60 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
61 95 U.S. 754 (1878).
62 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
6 "Much earlier, however, the legislatures both here and in
England began to evidence unanimous disapproval of the
rule against recovery for wrongful death." 398 U.S. at 389.
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time right to recover for wrongful death, admiralty is freed of
the nuisances of the operative effects of the various state
statutes. Harlan's opinion also indicates a thorough under-
standing of some rather complex concepts of federalism, in-
sofar as they are applicable to admiralty, and indicates the
Court's acceptance of Brennan's view as illustrated by his
opinion in The Tungus.
After reviewing the policy emphasis on allowing recov-
,ery in death cases as indicated by the enactment of the vari-
ous death statutes, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
Because the refusal of maritime law to provide such
a remedy appears to be jurisprudentially unsound and
to have produced serious confusion and hardship, that
refusal should cease unless there are substantial coun-
tervailing factors that dictate adherence to The Harr-
isburg simply as a matter of stare decisis. We now
turn to a consideration of those factors.04
The Harlan opinion in Moragne,6 5 besides announcing a long
desired substantive rule of admiralty law, is also important
for its discussion of the concept of stare decisis. He continued:
Very weighty considerations underlie the principle
that courts should not lightly overrule past decisions.
Among these are the desirability that the law furnish
a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable
them to plan their affairs with assurance against un-
toward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and
expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to
relitigate every relevant proposition in every case;
and the necessity of maintaining public faith in the
judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judg-
ments. The reasons for rejecting any established rule
must always be weighed against these factors.6
Weighed against these factors, a unanimous Court found no
justification for The Harrisburg rule, except that it had the
" 398 U.S. at 402-03.
M Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
66 398 U.S. at 403 (1970).
[Vol. 8, No. I
17
Taliaferro: Wrongful Death in Admiralty
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1972
WRONGFUL DEATH
blessing of age, and thus overruled that decision, stating: "We
accordingly overrule The Harrisburg, and hold that an action
does lie under general maritime law for death caused by vio-
lation of maritime duties." 7
Although the Court specifically chose to leave additional
important questions (e.g., whether any specific statute of
limitations is to be borrowed to implement this federal mari-
time right, or whether the doctrine of laches is applicable)
to await future litigation, its decision in Moragne is certainly
of enormous importance in clarifying the uncertainties of the
prior death cases, and its effect is sure to be felt in the poten-
tial maritime litigation that is certain to arise in Oklahoma
as a result of the Arkansas River Navigation Project.
Bruce 0. Taliaferro
07 398 U.S. at 409 (1970).
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